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The present study has investigated the channels through which the linkage between 
economic institutions and growth is gauged, by addressing the main hypothesis of the study 
that whether quality of governance and democratic institutions set a stage for economic 
institutions to promote the long-term growth process in Pakistan. To test the hypothesis 
empirically, our study models the dynamic relationship between growth and economic 
institutions in a time varying framework in order to capture institutional developments and 
structural changes occurred in the economy of Pakistan over the years. Study articulates that, 
along with some customary specifics, the quality of government and democracy are the 
substantial factors that affect institutional quality and ultimately cause to promote growth in 
Pakistan. 
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 ‘Once you start thinking about economic growth, it is hard to think about anything else’. 
Robert Lucas, Jr. (1988), Nobel Laureate Economist 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The objective of high economic growth rate for nation’s prosperity and progress is 
not novel and, traditionally, has been a central issue of economic policies throughout the 
world [Haller (2014)]. In the last few decades, cross countries income differentials have 
altered the attention of economic planners and economic scientists to unveil the factors 
responsible for this high income gaps across developed and developing nations 
[Flachaire, et. al (2014)]. That is why recent studies in new growth context argue a 
number of factors, beyond some traditional growth factors, that persuade long-term 
growth process. 
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The studies of [Rodrik, et al. (2004); Acemoglu, et al. (2001); Easterly and Levine 
(2003)], among others) accentuate ‘economic institutions’ as new growth imperative and 
acknowledge the potential role of economic institutions characterized in term of 
protection of property rights, effective legal system, enforcement of law and order, large 
size of government dealings, sound monetary system, freedom of international trade, and 
solid labor, housing, business and financial/credit market regulations [Knack and Keefer 
(1995); Chong and Calderon (2000); Engerman and Sokoloff (1997); Hall and Jones 
(1999); Frankel and Romer (1999); Acemoglu, et al. (2000); Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoḡlu (2008); Gwartney and Lawson (2003)]. 
Moreover, existing literature on this issue make us available with a conclusion that 
besides a number of other factors, including social asymmetry, cultural barriers, gender 
biasness, ethnic and racial discrimination, and economic inequalities—the quality of 
government (QoG) or good governance—is one of the significant factor persuades 
economic development because mare budget allocations of public resources do not 
necessarily outgrowth higher outcomes if budget formulation, execution and monitoring 
is malfunctioned [Dzhumashev (2014);  Ryvkin and Serra (2012); World Bank (2003)]. 
In the same way, fragile administration and management, especially in developing 
counties, has been well cited in order to explain the factors behind government failure in 
establishing institutions with a such incentive system that could reduce fraud, increase 
cost efficiency, and cause to promote growth process [Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008); 
World Bank (2003)]. Additionally, authors such as, Flachaire, et al. (2014) and 
Acemoglu, et al. (2005) proposed that the deep and proximate causes of growth rely on 
political institutions which devise economic institutions through the hypothesis of 
hierarchy of institutions.  
The narration of the above expressions implies that the effect of quality of 
governance under different political regime is observed indirectly via the improvement 
in economic institutions which, eventually, lead to economic growth. This paper seek 
to investigate empirically the role of governance in different political regimes, in 
explaining the relationship between growth and economic institutions incase of 
Pakistan. Using time series data, we employ rolling window two-stage least squares 
method to test the time varying relationship among concerned variables in order to 
capture institutional developments and structural changes in the economy of Pakistan 
over the period of time.  
After the introduction in the first section, rest of the paper follows as; Section 2 
reviews the literature. Data and methodology is presented in Section 3. Results and 
discussions are made in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There exist numerous studies on the relationship between economic growth and 
institutions at cross country level based on different income groups of countries. Yet 
evidences are not in surfeit in case of time series data. Most of the empirical research 
draws a conclusion that institutions are the factor that significantly expresses the cross 
country differences through different channels or controlling variables. In the following, 
review of different prior studies is made to have a comprehensive debate on institutions- 
growth nexus with different perspectives. 
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Since the seminal work of [North (1982)] on institutions and development, the 
researchers have made a noteworthy contribution to literature. Most of the empirical 
work is based on the pure cross section approach to investigate the links between 
institutions and economic growth, such as [Acemoglu, et al. (2001); Hall and Johns 
(1999); Grogan and Moers (2001); Knack and Keefer (1995), among others]. Evidences 
show that the impact of institutions on economic growth is significantly positive and very 
clear. Yet the channels through which the growth effects of institutions get upsurge, are 
different and involve countries’ geographic conditions, initial income level, countries 
income level groups, accumulation of human capital, political stability, trade openness, 
political regime and quality of governance, along with many others factors [see, for 
example, Acemoglu, et al. (2005); Eicher and Leukert (2009); Lipset (1960); Glaeser, et 
al. (2004); Flachaire, et  al. (2014)]. 
The empirical findings of Lee and Kim (2009) and Law and Bany-Ariffin (2008) 
demonstrate that there is bi-directional relationship between institutions and economic 
growth. However, the effects are strong in case of low and middle income countries 
group then that of high income countries. 
The consensus over the direction of causality between economic growth and 
institutions has aroused strong opposition in cross-section data approach, and subjected to 
econometric techniques as well as to the number of countries used in panel data (sample 
selection)- wherein some countries institutions cause economic growth, while in other 
countries economic growth effect institutions but full sample analysis fails to show 
different causality patterns each country inhabits [Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006)]. 
Moreover, the direction of causality may get change with the addition or reduction in the 
number of countries. For that reason time series data is more preferable [Law and Bany-
Ariffin (2013)]. Yet, the unavailability of long-time data set on institutions is one of the 
reasons for which time series analysis is sparse. 
A number of studies are available to explore the impact of political institutions 
on economic growth, although the findings are controversial regarding sign of 
correlates, and direct/indirect impact of political institutions on growth. For instance, 
Glaeser, et al. (2004) pointed out that political institutions impacts are direct and 
autocratic regimes are also often more growth promoting as compared to democratic 
regimes. In support to this, De Long and Shleifer (1993) and Jones and Olken (2005) 
argue that autocrats impose such a strict economic policies that are growth 
stimulating even if it cost for some sectors of electorates, while others prefer to 
dissuade growth in order to favor some dominant coalitions of political powers. Yet, 
Larsson and Parente (2011) is not in favor of above arguments and also claimed that 
political intuitions do not directly determine growth, instead they control the 
coefficients of covariates in the growth regression equation. 
In the light of above literature, our priority is that the economic institutions are the 
key determinants of growth and also translate indirect impact of other factors of growth 
including governance and political institutions. Thus it is the matter of great interest to 
investigate the economic institutions and growth nexus under novel confounding 
variables to propose some prudent policy framework to enhance economic growth in 
Pakistan.   
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3.  DATA, MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Data Description  
Study uses fresh time series data for the analysis starting from 1984 to 2013, 
collected from different sources based upon the availability of data. The data on GDP per 
capita (y) measured in current US Dollar, Gross fixed capital formation (k) measured in 
current US Dollars, is collected from World Development Indicators (WDI). While 
employed labor force (l) measured in millions of workers is gathered from Pakistan 
Labor Force Survey.  
In order to measure the economic institutions (EFW), different studies have used 
different proxies.  For example, studies like Vega-Gordillo and Alvarez-Arce (2003) have 
used economic freedom as a proxy of economic institutions from Fraser Institute. While 
S.H., Law (2014) measured economic freedom with three indicators including corruption, 
law and order and bureaucratic quality from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), a monthly publication report of Political Risk Services (PRS). 
Mostly cross-section studies follow Kaufmann, et al. (2008) approach, based on 
six indicators to measure different dimensions of institutional quality and governance, 
reported in World Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank. But shorter time span and 
alignment with the governance indicators limit its use to employ these indicators for the 
institutional quality. Following Gwartney and Lawson (2003), this paper uses a revised 
Economic Freedom of World Index
1
 (EFW-Index, thereafter) to measure economic 
institutions represented by economic freedom as a proxy. The dimensions/Indicators on 
which the EFW-Index is constructed are elaborated in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 
Indicators for Quality of Governance (QoG) and Quality of Economic Institutions (EFW) 








 Internal Conflict Index (IC) 0 – 12 
 Legal System and Property 
Rights 
0 - 10 
 Government Stability Index 
(GSTAB) 
0 – 12 
 Regulations: Labor, 
financial/credit, and business 
regulation etc. 
0 - 10 
 Investment Profile Index 
(IP) 
0 – 12  Freedom of trade internationally 0 - 10 
 Law and Order Index (LAO) 0 –6  Sound Monetary System 0 - 10 
 Democratic Accountability 
Index (DACC) 
0 –6 
 The size of Government: 
Revenues, Expenditures, and 
Enterprises 
0 - 10 
 Index for Army in Politics 
(AIP) 
0 –6   
 Corruption Index (CORR) 0 –6   
Note: The maximum value of index shows the best situation while zero indicates the worse condition.   
 
1The new and revised version of the EFW Index is built on the five indicators/areas to represent the 
economic freedom. For more detail see, Gwartney,  and  Lawson (2003).  The concept and measurement of 
economic freedom. European Journal of Political Economy 19:3, 405–430. 
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Following Flachaire, et al. (2014), the data on political institutions (Dem) to 
measure the degree of democracy
2
 is proxied by Polity IV collected from the Integrated 
Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Database, Centre for Systematic Peace. 
The index ranges from 0 (autocratic government) to 10 (full democratic government). 
The Quality of Governance (QoG) measured with a number of indicators/dimensions, is 
collected from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The Table 3.1 explains the 
different dimensions/indicators to measure the quality of governance.   
 
3.2.  The Model 
 
Economic Institutions in the Growth Process 
The main objective of the study is to investigate empirically the impact of 
economic institutions on economic growth in Pakistan. For this sake, drawing insights 





     0,   0 (1)  … … … … (1) 
Where Y(t) is the real output per capita, L(t) represents employed labor force, K(t)is the 
fixed capital formation and A(t) is the multifactor productivity (often termed as state of the 
technology or knowledge) that grows exponentially over time from its given initial level. 
A(t) = A(0)e
gt … … … … … … … 
(2)  
Taking insights from ‘New institutional economics’ that accentuate the role of 
institutions in explaining growth, beyond labour, physical and human capital 
accumulation (as taken in Solow and Ramsay Growth Models) and technological 
progress (Endogenous growth Theories). So, the extended production function can be 
specified by combining institutional quality proxies with some traditional growth factors 
i.e., labour and capital, as suggested by [Kirman (2007); Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Ndikumana  (2007); Gwartney, et al. (2006)]. 
Following the study of Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006), the evolution of the 
technology
3
 A(t), in Solow’s growth model, can be observed by incorporating economic 
institutions (EFW), governance (QoG) and democratic institutions (Dem) as the function 
of technology, A(t), such as:  
A(t) = f (EFW, Dem, QoG) … … … … … … (3)  
The impact of WFW, Dem and QoG can be observed by adding them as shifting 









  … … … … … (4)  
By putting the above value of A(t), the Equation (1) can be written as: 
 )]([)]([)0()( tKtLQoGDemEFWeAtY gt   … … … (5)  
 
2Basically, the term democracy indicates the provision of political rights of the individuals to 
participate in the political process actively, such that they have right for vote, freedom to compete for the public 
office, and for the electorates to have decisive votes on public policy issues  [Gastil (1986-1987), p. 7].   
3Landes (1999) has also emphasized that the embracement of the institutions is a major determinant that 
encourage innovations, technological progress and entrepreneurship.    
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Assuming the returns are constant, the above production function takes the 
following augmented Cobb-Douglas form: 
u
ttt eQOGDemEFWKLAtY
)(   … … … … … (6)  
By taking log, Equation (6) can be represented into the linearised Cobb-Douglas 
form: 
ttttttt uTQoGDemEFWkl  0   … … (7)  
Finally the Equation (7) indicates the elasticities of economic growth with respect 
to labour, capital, economic institutions, and also w.r.t control/confounding variables that 
include governance and level of democracy (autocracy).  In the next section, we represent 
the econometric methodology to estimate Equation (7).  
 
3.3.  Empirical Methodology  
A number of econometric methods are available in case of estimating the 
relationship between institution and economic growth, depending on the data type, 
sample size and time series characteristics of data. Mostly cross-sectional studies have 
used instrumental variable (IV) techniques like, Panel GMM method, 2SLS/3SLS, IV-
Random-effect, along with some other estimation methods like Pooled Mean Group, 
SUR estimation technique and Meta-regression analysis, because of particular advantages 
of these methodologies over others, e.g., fixed/random effects, Pooled OLS. For example, 
the studies of [Glaeser, et al. (2004); Aixala and Fabro (2008); Law and Bany-Ariffin 
(2008); Efendic,  et al. (2011)], among other] are well illustrative to the problem of the 
heterogeneity and reverse causality among variables. 
For causality inferences, Panel Least squares dummy-variable causality, 
Panel/pooled causality tests are prominent for penal data, while for time series analysis, 
VAR-based causality test are observed [Vega-Gordillo and Alvarez-Arce (2003); Chong 
and Calderon (2000)]. 
Our priority in this paper is to estimate the effects of economic institutions on 
economic growth in Pakistan by testing the contemporaneous effects of governance and 
democracy (autocracy) in the growth-institutions regression equation.
4
 Redek and Susjan 
(2005) and Eicher and Schreiber (2010) declared that the institutional changes have been 
observed as a dramatic phenomenon evolving rapidly over the time especially in 
transitional countries. Moreover is that when structural changes occur, institutional 
development materializes into difference sectors of economy and policy shift take places, 
then time series data might not have a single stable regime and experiences a structural 
breaks that, consequently, result in unstable regression parameters. Thus policy 
implication based on such results may lead to wrong directions. This paper takes into 
account the non-constancy of regression parameters and attempts to investigate the time 
varying relationship between economic institutions and growth.  
 
4Although sufficient studies have made efforts to test bi-directional relationship between institutions 
and growth [see, Lee and Kim (20090; Chong and Calderon  (2000); Barro (1996)]. Empirical findings of these 
studies reveal that institutions follow income. Our study does not takes  the causality inferences because this is 
beyond the scope of this paper, as we hypothesize to test the concurrent role governance and democracy for 
growth-institutions nexus in a novel time varying framework. 
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Rolling Window Two-Stage Least Squares  
The study uses rolling window two stage least square estimation technique in order 
to test our prior hypothesis that institutions and growth correlates in a non-constant 
fashion as time passes i.e., the coefficient of the variables do not remain constant for full 
sample size estimation [see, Pesaran and Timmermann (2012)]. Rolling two stage least 
squares regression is primarily an instrumental variable (IV) technique that tackles the 
problem of endogeneity of economic institution.
5
  This methodology is favorable in case 
of time series analysis to capture structural adjustment in a precise manner. The use of 
time varying estimation provides solution to a number of problem including model 
misspecification, unidentified functional form and spurious conclusion [Hall, et al. (2009, 
2010)].  
In order to estimate the time varying relationship for each observation, we need to 
set a window size (l), and step size which is usually taken one in time series data. There is 
no hard and fast rule in choosing window size (l), yet it should have a substantial size, 
balancing the tradeoff between accuracy and representativeness [Koutris, et al. (2008) 
and Balcilar, et al. (2010)].  
Time varying rolling estimation procedure is actually a process of sub-sampling 
which starts with a benchmark sample size that remains constant over the whole analysis, 
and adds one observation to the benchmark sample size by dropping the last one 
observation from it so that to obtain the regression parameters at each point of time for 
the whole sample. 
In the next section, we have estimated different dynamic versions of Equation (7) 




































 … … (8)  
Where ωt, φt, αt, βt,γt, δt, λt, θtare the time varying parameters while a, b, c, d, e, f indicate 
the lag length,  and μt is the error term. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, time varying estimates are presented, using rolling window two-
stage-least squares regressions. Our sample size, in this analysis, consists of 30 
observations while window size
6
 for rolling regressions is chosen 14. The instrumental 
variables (IV) used in the regression, are the immediate lags of explanatory variables as 
literature on time series analysis recommends.   
The preliminary regression results indicate employed labor force has been 
contributing positively to economic growth historically as indicated in Figure 1, yet 
 
5In our support of using this IV technique,  Efendic, et al. (2011)argues that evidences on growth-
institutions correlation are robust and significantly positive, yet degree of effect is sensitive to model 
specification and (non)treatment of endogeneity of the institutions.  
6Mostly in literature, studies have taken window size equals to one-third of the whole sample size. Yet 
we have chosen a bit larger size taking into account our use of dynamic regression analysis that involves lags.  
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capital contribution has not stimulated the output of the country and indicates a shortage 
of capital over the years, as shown in Figure 2. Growth has also effected from its 
immediate lag positively with a small negative impacts in the initial times as estimated in 
Figure 3. After investigating the time varying impact of labor and capital, subsequently 
output function is extended to include the economic institution (EFW), and further 
comprises on the democratic institutions (Dem).  
 
Fig.1:y=f(l.k, y(-1)) 
 Coefficient of LL and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV








1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig.2:y=f(l, k, y(-1)) 
 Coefficient of LK and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV










1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 3:y=f(l.k, y(-1)) 
 Coefficient of LRGDPPC(-1) and its
two*S.E. bands based on rolling IV







1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig.4:y=f(l.k, y(-1)) 
 Coefficient of C and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV







1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
The results indicate that economic institutions impact on growth is very poor, but 
the inclusion of time trend upsurges the institutions impact on growth. This shows that 
the institutions evolve over time that ultimately cause to promote growth positively [see, 
Figure 5 and Figure 6).  The effects of democracy on economic growth are nearly close to 
zero (Figure 7), while the inclusion of the time increases its positive impacts. This 
demonstrates that there is no direct impact of democracy-(autocracy) on growth; rather 
this relationship depends on time as Figure 8 makes the empirical evidences more clear. 
Moreover, the democratic institutions have indirect impact and via economic institutions 
it effect economic growth. However, the indirect impact is too small, unless time is added 
in regression, the comparison of Figure 5, Figure 9 and Figure 10 reveals. 
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Fig. 5:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1)) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV














1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 6:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Time trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV













1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig.7:y=f(l.k, y(-1), Dem, Dem(-1)) 
 Coefficient of DEM and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 8: y=f(l.k, y(-1), Dem, Dem(-1), Time 
Trend) 
 Coefficient of DEM and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV











1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
 
Fig. 9:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1)) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV










1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 10:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1)), Time trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig.11:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), LAO, LAO(-1) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV










1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 12: y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1),LAO,LAO(-1), Time 
Trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
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Contemporaneous Role of Governance and Democratic Institutions in Economic   
Institutions—Growth Nexus 
Furthermore, our analysis takes governance and democratic institutions in 
explaining time varying impact of economic institutions on growth. Figure 11 reveals that 
the impact of law and order (LAO) in the country is growth encouraging by providing 
incentives to the economic institutions to grow. The indirect impact of law and order is 
significantly large when time is added in the regression, indicating that this development 
involves time (as it is clear from Figure. 12 in comparison to Figure. 11 and Figure 9).  
 
Fig. 13:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), IP, IP(-1)) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV












1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 14:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), IP, IP(-1), Time trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV










1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 15:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), IC, IC(-1)) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 16: y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), IC, IC(-1), Time Trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV











1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
The investment profile (IP) as a confounding variable indicates a growth deterging 
situation. This means that in the presence of investment risks such as repatriation of 
profits and payments delays, economic institutions’ strength to persuade economic 
growth turns to decrease as shown in Figure 13. Moreover, the internal conflict that are 
responsible for political stability is a vital source that effect the performance of 
government and consequently, influences the economic growth badly via economic 
institutions. 
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The results appeared in Figure 15 and Figure 16 indicate that political stability or 
the internal conflicts are deterring the economic growth by retracting the role of 
economic institution in growth process over a period of time.  In the same way, in the 
recent years, the governing stability indicates its falling positive impacts on economic 
institutions over the time. The less government effectiveness in pursuing its declared 
development programs causing to decrease economic institutions impact on growth (as 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 makes the empirical evidences clear).   
 
Fig. 17:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), Dem, 
Dem(-1), GSTAB, GSTAB(-1)) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV










1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 18:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), GSTAB, GSTAB(-1), 
Time trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 19:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), Dem, 
Dem(-1), DACC, DACC(-1)) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 20: y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem,Dem(-1), DACC, DACC(-1), Time 
Trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
The democratic accountability (DACC) is also considered one of the important 
dimensions of government quality. Figure 19 and 20 indicated that it is growth promoting 
if democratic government is more accountable to its people and creates a people’s 
participatory environment. The democratic accountability turns more effective as the time 
passes, results reveal.   
The control over corruption is a major indicator of government quality. In 
Pakistan, it has been a worsening condition regarding the control over corruption which is 
making government fail in building quality economic institutions.  
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Fig. 21:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), CORR, CORR(-1)) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV










1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 22:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), CORR, CORR(-1), Time 
trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig.23:y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), AIP, AIP(-1)) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV







1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Fig. 24: y=f(l.k, y(-1), EFW, EFW(-1), 
Dem, Dem(-1), AIP, AIP(-1), Time Trend) 
 Coefficient of EFW and its two*S.E.
bands based on rolling IV







1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
 
Results pointed out that corruption has been a significant element in deteriorating 
institutions positive effect on economic growth. The reason may be the limited use of 
public office for the national interest, rather than for the benefits of some dominant 
coalitions at the cost of national prosperity. The role of military has been positive with 
growth via improving institutions as represented in Figure 23 and Figure 24.    
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we have tested our main hypothesis- that is to investigate the 
different factors that cause to effect economic growth via economic institutions. The 
study used time series data ranges from 1984-2013 and employed rolling window2SLS 
technique in order to gauge time varying relationship among variables. The crux of the 
study goes over the main points: beyond some traditional growth factors, the performance 
of economic institutions in encouraging economic growth of Pakistan is very subjective 
and depends on a number of other confounding factors like governance quality, 
democratic institutions and time dimensions. Primarily, results suggest that translation of 
the growth effect of economic institutions from negative to positive require time. 
Furthermore, democratic institutions (movement from autocratic to democratic regime) 
are turning to be inclusive by responding to build inclusive economic institutions that 
lead to high economic growth—but still the impact is very small and requires time to 
evolve, results reveal. 
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Moreover, study explores the fact that the quality of governance, along with 
democracy, is a significant factor that explains the relationship between economic growth 
and economic institutions. The quality of governance indicators, like maintenance of law 
and order, good investment profile/ regulatory quality, government stability, democratic 
accountability, and army political role, are the factors causing to promote economic 
growth by improving the quality of economic institutions in Pakistan. While government 
is lacking in controlling over corruption and political violence (internal conflicts) that’s 
why economic institutions are losing its positive impact on economic growth, results 
reveals. The study recommend a prudent economic policy that government is in sturdy 
need of controlling corruption, and to resolve the internal conflicts in order to make the 
quality of government better along with its other components, under a democratic 
governing system.  
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